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REPLY TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee states numerous times in his Statement of Facts found at page no.4,
last full paragraph, that the recommendations of Commissioner Michael S. Evans at
the Pre-Trial Settlement Conference held July 1, 2001 were mere "suggestions."
Appellee admits that Commissioner Evans stated, "The premarital agreement was
unenforceable due to it's apparent deficiency in that it does not include a disclosure
of assets." In other words, Appellee admits that Commissioner Evans stated that the
premarital agreement was invalid on its face. Even though Commissioner Evans
stated that it was Appellant's burden to prove that Appellee was able to pay alimony
given his income from pension and social security, Commissioner Evans did not hint
or even suggest that it was Appellant's burden to prove that the premarital
agreement had apparent deficiencies and was unenforceable.
Further, Appellee admits that in the Minute Entry on a Law and Motion hearing
held October 23, 2001, the Commissioner pointed out that he had previously
considered the enforce ability of the Premarital Agreement and had recommended
that the document was "invalid" (R. at 126).
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Interestingly enough, Appellee submits no response to Appellant's citing of
Rule 6-401(4), Rules of Judicial Administration wherein it states, "A recommended
order of a court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court"
(when this rule was cited in the initial brief of the Appellant filed in October 2003, the
location of the cited rule was in the Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 6-401 (4).
Subsequently, this rule has been transferred and is currently found in the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 7(g)).
Additionally, Appellee claims in his Summary of the Argument at page no. 8
that, "Regardless of the existence of the Admissions, Appellant failed to meet all
three elements required to prove the Premarital agreement was unenforceable as
set forth in Utah Code Annotated Section 30-8-6 (1)." Appellee fails to recognize
that Appellant did not need to meet the elements required to prove the Premarital
Agreement was unenforceable because the Court had already ruled on that issue.
In Appellee's final paragraph under the Summary of the Argument section,
Appellee states in reference to the enforce ability of the Premarital Agreement that,
"If either ruling had been an error, it would have been harmless error since alimony
would not have been granted." Appellee elaborates further on the harmless error
doctrine. In his final section under this heading Appellee states, "Even if the Court
had determined that the Premarital Agreement was not enforceable, there would not
4
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be an alimony awarded due to the circumstances of the case." Appellee ignores
Utah Code Section 30-3-5 (7)(c) wherein it states that:
As a general rule, the Court should look to the standard of the living,
existing at the time of separation in determining alimony in accordance
with Subsection (a). However, the Court shall consider all relevant
facts and equitable principles and may in its digression, base alimony
on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages
of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born during
the marriage, the Court may consider the standard of living that existed
at the time of the marriage."
Appellee attempts to persuade the Court that the parties had similar incomes
and similar monthly expenses. Appellee fails to inform the Court that there are
numerous affidavits filed by the Appellant throughout the course of litigation, with
very specific statements made by the Appellant in regards to Appellee's millions of
dollars. Specifically, Appellee did not dispute Appellant's assertion that during the
marriage Appellee sold land to a school district for several millions of dollars.
Appellant's affidavit is explicit and is part of the Court file which outlines not only the
millions of dollars that Appellee had access to but of the standards of living the
parties enjoyed during the four year marriage relationship.
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO ARGUMENT OF APPELLEE
Appellee states in his argument section at page 10, the first partial paragraph
that, "Even if the fact of full disclosure had not been admitted in discovery, there still
5
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is evidence of full disclosure and/or reasonable prior knowledge. Therefore, under
Utah law, the Premarital Agreement was enforceable." Simply put, Appellee makes
bald assertions in this statement because the trial judge ruled on the enforce ability
of the Premarital Agreement and, the Court actually entered Summary Judgement
against Appellant as was requested by the Appellee in his Motion for Summary
Judgement filed in December, 2001. Appellee should not be allowed to claim on one
hand that Appellant provided no evidence regarding enforce ability of the Premarital
Agreement and then on the other hand represent to the Court that Appellee gave a
full disclosure and/or Appellant having reasonable prior knowledge regarding the
extent of Appellee's estate and assets with Appellee providing no proof of doing so.
Further, Appellee claims that Utah case law states that, "Even if Appellant had been
able to show some non-disclosure of assets prior to the signing of the Premarital
Agreement, Appellant would have failed to show that such a non-disclosure was
material." (Appellee cites In Re Estate of Beeslev. 883 P.2d 1343, 1348 (Utah
1994)). Appellant admits that Appellee has correctly stated Utah case law on the
issue, but the problem with Appellee's assertion is that the Court had already ruled
on two separate occasions that the Premarital Agreement was unenforceable. After
the Court ruled, Appellant did not have a responsibility to prove that any disclosure
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was material or immaterial. Again, Appellant asserts that there is absolutely no
evidence of full disclosure or reasonable prior knowledge that has been elicited from
Appellee.
Appellee states at page no. 11, last partial paragraph of line 4 that, "Appellant
asserts that the enforce ability of the Premarital Agreement, in which alimony is
waived, is key to the issue of alimony and that the Premarital Agreement is all that
stands between Appellant and an alimony award. This statement is absolutely
contrary to Appellant's position. Appellant submits that even if the Premarital
Agreement is deemed valid and enforceable, point no. 2 of Appellant's initial brief
sets forth Appellant's argument that the Court should have examined the statutory
factors of alimony found in the Utah Code regardless of the Court ruling concerning
the enforcement of the Premarital Agreement.
Additionally, when Judge Nehring ruled that, "As a matter of law there will be
no alimony awarded in the case based on the deemed admitted request for
admissions" in effect granted Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgement. Judge
Nehring failed to rule on the previous two court orders establishing the
unenforceability of the Premarital Agreement and did not allow Appellant to have the
statutory factors of alimony examined consistent with Utah Code Section 30-3-5 and
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).

Recently, the Court stated that,
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"Summary Judgement is only appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and

the moving party is entitled to a judgement as a matter of law."

491 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, Sonnenreich, In re.
Numerous affidavits submitted by Appellant prove that there are numerous
issues of fact that are clearly in dispute and summary judgement and the ruling of
the trial judge was in error.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the errors committed by the trial court, Petitioner requests that
the trial court rulings be reversed.
DATED this

-^

day of

MffiMr

2004.

David J Friel
Attorney for Appellant
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